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I. Executive Summary
With the highest top marginal corporate tax 
rate among OECD nations and the third highest in 
the world at 35 percent, it is not surprising that 
policymakers have long evinced a desire to lower 
the U.S. federal corporate income tax rate. Doing 
so would have implications for a wide range of 
outcomes — from federal revenue to foreign 
direct investment — but the effects of such a 
change on the labor market are less understood.
Despite high corporate income tax rates, the 
United States collects relatively little revenue from 
the corporate income tax — slightly more than 
$300 billion in 2016, which amounts to about 10 
percent of all federal receipts. High corporate 
income tax rates are cause for concern, as they 
deter multinationals from locating investment in 
the United States and reduce the amount of capital 
formation in the country, which affects 
employment and wages.
Economists establish the effect of the 
corporate income tax on employment and wages 
by using a wide range of methods, including 
international, national, and state-level 
comparisons. The key to any empirical work is 
attempting to disentangle the effects of the 
corporate income tax from other factors that may 
be correlated with both the corporate tax and 
labor outcomes. We find estimates that use a 
treatment and comparison set up within the 
framework of the vast array of state-level 
corporate tax changes to be the most effective way 
to establish a clear link between corporate taxes 
and labor outcomes. Other work that relies on 
only federal changes is complicated by the many 
national factors that also change with time.
In general, empirical work with the strongest 
results, that controls for factors of influence 
outside corporate income taxes, generally 
suggests an elasticity of employment regarding 
the corporate income tax rate of between -0.2 and 
-0.4, with a wage-income elasticity near -0.5. In the 
context of recent tax reform discussions that 
propose a rate reduction of 10 to 20 percentage 
points, that would imply long-run employment 
gains between 6 and 22 percent and wage 
increases between 15 and 28 percent.
Andrew Hanson is 
an associate professor 
of economics at 
Marquette University, 
and Ike Brannon is 
president of Capital 
Policy Analytics and a 
visiting senior fellow at 
the Cato Institute.
In this report, 
Hanson and Brannon 
examine the empirical 
literature on the effect 
of corporate income 
taxes on labor, arguing that corporate tax 
reform would boost employment.
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In terms of applicability to potential federal 
changes to the corporate income tax, there are 
some caveats to consider. First, all empirical 
estimates are necessarily from a different time and 
place, compared with when and where a new 
policy will be implemented. Second, the United 
States has a different baseline than other countries 
that change corporate tax policy. Third, it is 
unclear how other countries, U.S. state 
government policy, and our own Federal Reserve 
might react to federal corporate tax policy 
changes. Finally, the state-level estimates we cite 
are all in the context of existing federal policy, and 
these differences pale in comparison with many 
international business climate differences. 
Although there is some uncertainty about how 
well existing empirical estimates would translate 
to any federal corporate income tax reduction, we 
find the notion that corporate tax reform would 
boost employment and wages to be a strong 
result.
II. Introduction
The United States has the highest top 
marginal corporate income tax rate among the 
OECD members at 35 percent (38.9 percent when 
combined with subnational taxes).1 The U.S. 
corporate tax rate is the highest among the OECD 
group and the third highest rate in the world, 
surpassed only by Puerto Rico and the United 
Arab Emirates.2 Meanwhile, corporate income tax 
rates have been declining around the world for 
the last two decades; the average corporate 
income tax rate in the OECD has fallen from 30 
percent in 2003 to 22.5 percent in 2016.3
Despite high corporate income tax rates, the 
United States collects relatively little revenue 
from the corporate income tax — slightly more 
than $300 billion in 2016, which amounts to about 
10 percent of all federal receipts.4 High corporate 
income tax rates are cause for concern; high rates 
deter multinationals from locating investment in 
the United States and, more generally, reduce the 
amount of capital formation in the country. 
Lowering corporate tax rates is cited as a top 
policy priority by multinational corporations over 
changing other aspects of the tax code.5
More generally, the contrast between the high 
rates and low income illustrates a basic problem 
with taxing corporation income: It is an incredibly 
distorting tax. Companies go to great lengths to 
reduce or eliminate tax liability, and despite the 
best intentions of Congress or the White House, it 
can be difficult or impossible — from both a 
political and a practical perspective — to reduce 
or eliminate such behavior.
However, the tax treatment of corporations 
may also have implications that extend beyond 
the boardroom to affect the U.S. labor force. There 
is a growing empirical literature on the effect of 
corporate income taxes on employment and 
income. Empirical estimates, rather than 
theoretical models that abstract from many of the 
realities of the U.S. and world economy, offer the 
best hope of understanding how changes to the 
current federal corporation income tax may affect 
workers. Empirical estimates in the existing 
literature come with a unique set of challenges — 
including methodological issues, data 
applicability, and the geographic area analyzed — 
that do not make them perfectly applicable to 
recent tax reform discussions without some 
caveats.
In general, empirical work with the strongest 
results — that best control for other factors of 
influence — estimates an elasticity of 
employment regarding the corporate income tax 
rate of between -0.2 and -0.4, with a wage-income 
elasticity near -0.5. In terms of prediction, These 
elasticities imply that a 10 percent decrease in the 
corporate tax rate would lead to a 2 percent to 4 
percent increase in employment and a 5 percent 
gain in wages.
1
OECD, “Corporate and Capital Income Taxes,” at Table II.1 
(2017).
2
Kyle Pomerleau and Emily Potosky, “Corporate Income Tax 
Rates Around the World, 2016,” The Tax Foundation Fiscal Fact 
No. 525 (2016).
3
Id.
4
Office of Management and Budget Historical Tables, 
“Percentage Composition of Receipts by Source: 1934-2021,” at 
Table 2.2 (corporate taxes averaged 10.1 percent of federal receipts 
between 2000 and 2015).
5
Tom Neubig, “Where’s the Applause? Why Most Corporations 
Prefer a Lower Rate?” Tax Notes, Apr. 24, 2006, p. 483.
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III. Conceptual Framework
The economic effects of the corporate income 
tax are wide-ranging. Because the corporate 
income tax is essentially a tax on profits, it affects 
all decisions regarding how corporations earn a 
profit. While this report considers how it affects 
employment and wages, the corporate income tax 
also affects where companies locate, the amount 
of capital investment, where to locate that 
investment, and various other decisions.
A. Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax
There is a long literature that examines the 
incidence of corporate taxes, with implications for 
employment (and wages). “Incidence” refers to 
which entity bears the burden of the tax after 
considering the cumulative effects the tax may 
have on various prices and corporate behavior. 
The entity that writes the check does not 
necessarily pay the tax, economics has long taught 
us.
For example, when corporate taxes increase, 
we would say that workers effectively pay the 
incremental tax if we observed that wages and 
employment decline as a result. Alan J. Auerbach6 
offers an extensive review of corporate tax 
incidence, focusing on how theoretical models 
explain the incidence of the corporate tax and how 
different variations of these models can imply 
something different about who ultimately pays 
for the corporate tax. Auerbach points out that if a 
corporate income tax causes the capital-labor ratio 
to decline, it would result in falling wages and 
workers bearing the burden of the tax.
Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. 
Hines7 offer a lucid explanation of how corporate 
income taxes may in theory adversely affect 
workers in both a closed and open economy. In a 
closed economy model, which probably doesn’t 
represent the United States well, Desai, Foley, and 
Hines point out that taxes on corporate income 
raise the cost of production done by corporations. 
However, not all production is done through 
corporations — the high corporate tax rates have 
begotten a large number of partnerships, sole 
proprietorships, S corporations, and other 
passthrough entities — so the corporate tax may 
induce production to shift to the noncorporate 
sector. If the ratio of capital to labor is higher in the 
noncorporate sector, resources flowing into the 
noncorporate sector will raise the demand for 
capital in turn, which could conceivably raise the 
after-tax return on capital enough to induce 
substitution away from labor and toward capital. 
The result would be that workers bear the burden 
of the corporate income tax.8
Desai aver that in an open economy, which 
may be a better representation of the United 
States, corporate taxes may be even more likely to 
be paid for by workers. Their intuition is that if 
capital is mobile across international borders, 
then the after-tax return to capital must be the 
same across the economies of the world in 
equilibrium (presuming that capital flows to the 
highest after-tax return destination). If this is true, 
corporate income taxes discourage investment in 
a country. Also, because the after-tax return to 
capital must equalize across countries, inputs that 
are immobile (or less mobile) will bear the burden 
of the corporate income tax. Labor, or other less 
mobile factors of production, would therefore pay 
for the corporate income tax via lower wages.
IV. Empirical Evidence
The intuition in Desai, Foley, and Hines, 
comes from a long line of theoretical work on the 
corporate income tax. Economists have 
traditionally used dynamic, general equilibrium, 
theoretical models of the U.S. economy to study 
how corporate taxes affect employment and 
wages. The problem with these models is that 
they may miss important aspects of the real 
economy that are relevant to the relationship 
between corporate taxes and outcomes for 
workers. More recently, the availability of data 
and advances in econometric techniques have 
allowed for an empirical investigation into how 6
Alan J. Auerbach, “Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of 
What We Know,” in 20 Tax Pol’y and the Econ. (2006).
7
Desai, Foley, and Hines, “Labor and Capital Shares of the 
Corporate Tax Burden: International Evidence,” unpublished 
manuscript prepared for presentation at the International Tax 
Policy Forum and Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center conference 
on Who Pays the Corporate Tax in an Open Economy? (Dec. 18, 
2007).
8
Desai, Foley, and Hines note that this effect is mitigated by the 
fact that labor costs are deductible under a corporate income tax, so 
the initial effect of a corporate income tax would be to substitute 
toward labor in the corporate sector.
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corporate taxes affect economic activity. We 
examine that literature to gain an understanding 
of how the corporate income tax affects labor — 
not in theory, but in practice.
A. U.S. Evidence at the Federal Level
Karel Mertens and Morten O. Ravn9 provide 
the only recent direct evidence on the effects of the 
federal corporate income tax rate on employment. 
Following Christina Romer and David Romer,10 
Mertens and Ravn rely on the “narrative” method 
of estimation, which attempts to sort out tax 
changes that were in effect a “surprise” to the 
economy. Their goal is to separate the effect of the 
tax change from other factors that occur 
simultaneously in the economy — most notably a 
response to deficit concerns.
Mertens and Ravn rely on a sample of 
quarterly data on the U.S. economy from 1950 to 
2006 and directly examine corporate tax liability 
rather than a policy measure like corporate tax 
rates. They find that a 1 percentage point 
reduction in the average corporate income tax rate 
increases real GDP per capita immediately by 0.4 
percent and by another 0.6 percent with a one-
year lag. They also find that cutting the average 
corporate tax rate does not affect tax revenue and 
does not affect employment in the aggregate.
While the Mertens and Ravn work is novel in 
its approach and unique in examining U.S. federal 
corporate taxes only, it has several shortcomings 
that call into question their failure to discern any 
employment effects of a change in the corporate 
tax rate.
First, the analysis uses the average corporate 
tax rate as a measure of corporate income tax 
policy, calculated as tax liability divided by 
corporate profits. The problem with this approach 
is that anything that affects corporate profits or 
general tax liability that might also affect 
employment might bias the study’s results. For 
example, if the economy is moving into recession, 
corporate profits typically shrink. This would 
artificially inflate the Mertens and Ravn measure 
of average corporate tax rate at a time when firms 
are likely shedding employees — causing 
estimates of tax policy to be biased against finding 
an employment effect.
Second, it relies on a small set of corporate tax 
changes — 16 in total over 56 years of data. In fact, 
Alexander Ljungqvist and Michael Smolyansky11 
point out that there have been only three rate 
changes to the top federal corporate tax rate since 
1969 (as opposed to 271 state-level changes): a 2 
percentage point decline in 1979, a 12-point 
reduction in 1986, and a 1 percentage point 
increase in 1993. It is not clear to us how 
representative the changes identified by Mertens 
and Ravn are, beyond the three explicit rate 
reductions in the current economic climate.
Finally, Mertens and Ravn rely on time-series 
variation and simply cannot rule out the 
possibility that other factors in the economy, 
changing at or around the same time as their 
narrative shocks, are driving their results. 
Mertens and Ravn are not able to construct a valid 
counterfactual benchmark for how the U.S. 
employment situation would have evolved in the 
absence of corporate income tax changes.
B. Evidence From U.S. States
The promise of using state-level changes in 
the corporation tax rate is that it provides a much 
larger and stronger data set that makes 
controlling for economic fluctuations and similar 
exogenous forces easier to accomplish.
J. William Harden and William H. Hoyt12 
provide an important review of the older economic 
literature that generally examines how state taxes 
(including business incentives and the corporate 
tax) affect employment as well as an analysis of 
how corporate taxes affect employment. Using 
annual U.S. state-level data between 1977 and 1994, 
Harden and Hoyt control for fixed state and year 
differences in the data and by doing so identify the 
effect of corporate taxes on employment using 
9
Mertens and Ravn, “The Dynamic Effects of Personal and 
Corporate Income Tax Changes in the United States,” 103 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 1212 (2013).
10
Romer and Romer, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax 
Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks,” 100 
Am. Econ. Rev. 763 (2010).
11
Ljungqvist and Smolyansky, “To Cut or Not to Cut? On the 
Impact of Corporate Taxes on Employment and Income,” Finance 
and Economics Discussion Series Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors Working Paper (2016).
12
Harden and Hoyt, “Do States Choose Their Mix of Taxes to 
Minimize Employment Losses?” 56 Nat’l Tax J. 7 (2003).
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state-level corporate tax changes. Harden and Hoyt 
take an all-encompassing view of the corporate tax, 
measuring the size of the corporate tax burden as 
corporate tax revenue divided by personal income 
in a state. Importantly, because corporations may 
take time in adjusting to corporate tax policy, 
Harden and Hoyt examine the effects on 
employment through a lagged relationship.
Harden and Hoyt find a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the 
corporate tax burden in a state and employment 
growth. Holding total revenue constant, Harden 
and Hoyt estimate that shifting 10 percent of the 
tax burden in a state from the corporate tax to 
another revenue source would increase the 
employment growth rate by 2.83 percent. 
Notably, the gains Harden and Hoyt report are for 
individual income taxes replacing corporate 
taxes; employment gains would likely be larger if 
revenue were replaced with a more efficient tax, 
such as a VAT, a carbon tax, or some other tax on 
consumption.
Alison R. Felix13 extends the previous 
literature by examining the effect of U.S. state 
corporate taxes on worker wages using a more 
recent data set spanning the period between 1977 
and 2005. Felix estimates the relationship between 
corporate taxes and wages using a simple 
regression framework. She controls for the many 
other factors besides taxes that might affect 
worker wages, including individual factors (such 
as age, education, and occupation) as well as 
other, state-level factors (including income taxes, 
sales taxes, and government services). She uses 
the top marginal corporate tax rate in a state to 
measure the corporate tax burden and estimate 
the relationship between corporate taxes and 
wages.
The Felix model indicates a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the 
top marginal corporate tax rate and worker 
wages, with a magnitude that suggests that a 1 
percentage point increase in the top corporate tax 
rate will reduce employment by between 0.14 and 
0.36 percent. A 15 percent corporate rate 
reduction, then, translates to employment gains 
of between 2 percent and 5 percent — the 
equivalent of 2.8 million to 7 million new workers.
Felix also shows that while the effect of the top 
marginal corporate tax rate is negative 
throughout the sample period, the relationship 
between the corporate tax rate and employment is 
stronger in the later part of the sample rather than 
in the earlier part. In fact, between 1997 and 2001, 
a 1 percentage point increase in the top corporate 
tax rate reduces employment by nearly 0.7 
percent, which is more than double the effect in 
the earlier years of the sample. The changing 
relationship between the corporate tax and wages 
could result from increased competition among 
U.S. states or by foreign nations for mobile capital, 
she hypothesizes.
Xiaobing Shuai and Christine Chmura14 
further extend previous analyses of U.S. state 
corporate tax policy by using updated data on job 
creation and state corporate tax policy changes 
between 1990 and 2012. During the sample period 
used by Shuai and Chmura, 30 states made 
corporate tax rate changes, which offers a 
“laboratory” to discover how differences in the 
corporate tax rate affect job creation.
The Shuai and Chmura model controls for 
general time effects using a fixed-effects 
estimation strategy, which offers control over 
many other factors that could bias their study, but 
their preferred model does not incorporate state-
level fixed effects. The Shuai and Chmura 
estimates indicate that state corporate tax rates are 
negatively and statistically significantly related to 
employment growth. They estimate that 
employment will grow 0.03 to 0.05 percentage 
points faster in a state with a 1 percentage point 
lower corporate tax rate, or that the elasticity of 
employment regarding the corporate tax rate is 
-0.2. That translates to employment growth of 0.6 
percent to 1 percent faster per year for a reduction 
in the corporate tax rate to 15 percent, as proposed 
by the Trump administration.
Xavier Giroud and Joshua Rauh15 also exploit 
state corporate tax policy differences as they 
13
Felix, “Do State Corporate Income Taxes Reduce Wages?” 94 
Econ. Rev. – Fed. Res. Bank of Kansas City 77 (2009).
14
Shuai and Chmura, “The Effect of State Corporate Income Tax 
Rate Cuts on Job Creation,” 48 Bus. Econ. 183 (2013).
15
Giroud and Rauh, “State Taxation and the Reallocation of 
Business Activity: Evidence From Establishment-Level Data,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 21534 
(2015).
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relate to employment and business establishment 
location. They constructed a sample of all U.S. 
business establishments with at least 100 
employees that were active in multiple states 
between 1977 and 2011. Their model controls for 
constant differences among states, time-varying 
characteristics that are common to all states, and 
many other economic factors that differ across 
both states and time.
They find that a 1 percentage point increase in 
a state corporate tax rate leads to the closing of 
0.03 business establishments and that about half 
of the effect occurs because companies can shift 
locations to competing states. On the employment 
side, Giroud and Rauh find that a 10 percent 
increase in the corporate tax rate corresponds to a 
4 percent decline in employment at corporations 
that are subject to the tax increase. As a check for 
spurious correlation, Giroud and Rauh find no 
correlation between employment at corporations 
and changes in the personal income tax rate, 
lending credibility to their estimates.
Finally, Ljungqvist and Smolyansky estimate 
the effect of U.S. state corporate tax changes using 
the experience of counties located on the border of 
states with differing tax policies. Their data span 
1970-2010, and they examine 140 separate tax 
increases in 45 states (and the District of Columbia) 
and 131 tax cuts in 35 states for their analysis. The 
employment data they analyze are taken from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic 
Accounts, which documents annual employment 
and income at the county level. Their analysis relies 
heavily on the natural experiment approach to state 
corporate tax changes but also controls for time-
varying factors such as demographic characteristics 
of residents.
They find that increasing the corporate tax 
rate leads to significant reductions in employment 
(and income) for residents. They estimate that a 1 
percentage point increase in the top marginal 
corporate income tax rate reduces employment by 
0.3 percent to 0.5 percent, but they also find that 
cutting corporate taxes does not have a 
corresponding positive effect unless the 
government implements the reductions during a 
recession.
Ljungqvist and Smolyansky also find a large 
effect on incomes, with a 1 percentage point 
increase in the top marginal corporate income tax 
rate corresponding to an income loss of between 
0.3 percent and 0.6 percent. Cutting corporate 
taxes does not have a corresponding positive 
effect on income unless (again) the cuts are made 
during a recession.
Importantly, Ljungqvist and Smolyansky use 
a measure of employment and income based on 
the residence of individuals and not the location of 
businesses. This likely means they underestimate 
the effect of corporate taxes on the outcomes of 
interest because workers themselves are mobile 
and may look for work in neighboring counties 
when corporate tax changes affect their wages.
As a partial solution to this problem, Shawn 
Rohlin, Stuart Rosenthal, and Amanda Ross16 use 
data that is based on business location and apply 
a similar border method to state-level corporate 
tax changes. They examine the effects of tax 
changes on the propensity for businesses to open 
in the face of corporate income tax changes and 
find extremely large and negative effects — a 
higher corporate tax substantially reduces the 
probability that a new business starts operation in 
an area, which necessarily reduces employment. 
The primary sample used by Rohlin, Rosenthal, 
and Ross examines border states with a reciprocal 
tax agreement so that labor mobility across 
borders is not an issue in their estimates.
The data show that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the top marginal corporate tax rate 
reduces the likelihood of a corporate business 
opening in the county by a whopping 34 percent. 
This effect is larger for manufacturing and 
service-based businesses and slightly smaller for 
retail-based businesses.
In short, the data from state-based research 
consistently reveals that higher corporate taxes 
reduce employment and compensation.
C. International Evidence
The U.S state corporate tax literature may 
offer the most potential for understanding the 
effects of changing federal corporate tax policy 
because all states operate within the laws and 
business climate of the United States. However, 
state corporate tax policy may be dwarfed by 
16
Rohlin, Rosenthal, and Ross, “Tax Avoidance and Business 
Location in a State Border Model,” 83 J. of Urban Econ. 34 (2014).
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federal policy, so using state data to infer the effect 
of changes at the federal level may very well cause 
economists to underestimate the size of expected 
federal changes.
Examining corporate tax policy from an 
international perspective is advantageous 
because it can give a clearer picture of the 
potential effects of corporate tax policy changes 
on a national basis. However, the apparent gain in 
estimating size effects comes at the cost of 
examining corporate taxes in what is often a 
completely different legal and business 
environment than that of the United States. 
What’s more, most other OECD countries — 
they’re typically the comparisons used, by dint of 
the availability of data as well as the fact that they 
comprise the universe of developed countries — 
are much more closely integrated with their 
immediate neighbors and trading partners than is 
the United States, making such comparisons 
complicated.
A few international studies are similar to 
analyses made across U.S. states, examining 
corporate tax policy across areas within a country 
where policy differs. We analyze a few such 
studies, all of which have been published 
relatively recently.
For instance, Lars Feld and Gebhard 
Kirchgässner17 examine the effect of corporate 
taxes on resident employment across Swiss 
cantons (a canton is a division of the country 
similar to states in the United States). They show 
that corporate income taxes deter companies from 
operating and reduce employment for residents 
after controlling for factors like wages, education, 
and demographic differences. Their data 
encompass the years 1985 to 1997, in a context of 
low federal corporate income taxes, and reveal a 
relatively small magnitude of response from 
employment — a 10 percent increase in corporate 
tax leads to an employment loss of about 1 
percent.
Simeon Djankov and his coauthors18 study the 
effect of corporate taxes using a cross section of 85 
countries in the year 2004, focusing on how one 
country’s policy would affect a standardized 
company. This approach is interesting because it 
examines corporate tax policy in many countries, 
but the use of only a cross section, as opposed to a 
panel of data, means that other differences across 
countries might influence the results. Djankov et 
al. do not examine employment directly but 
instead examine entrepreneurship, finding that 
corporate taxes have a large negative effect on 
entrepreneurial activity (as well as a large 
negative effect on foreign direct investment, 
which is directly relevant to job creation and 
wages). They estimate that a 10 percentage point 
increase in the corporate tax rate (applying to 
first-year businesses) reduces the number of 
companies by 1.9 per 100 people, or by 38 percent. 
They also find that a 10 percentage point increase 
in the average corporate tax rate reduces the rate 
of businesses entering a country by 1.4 percentage 
points, or 17.5 percent at the mean.
Using a smaller sample of countries over a 25-
year panel, Kevin Hassett and Aparna Mathur19 
are able to account for country-specific fixed 
effects, or anything else about a country that 
differs, besides the corporate tax, and is constant 
across time. The Hassett and Mathur model also 
controls for time-period effects and other factors 
that change across both time and countries 
besides corporate taxes. They find that corporate 
taxes (measured as either effective or marginal 
rates) have a substantial negative effect on worker 
wages — a 1 percent increase in the corporate tax 
rate leads to a 0.5 percent decline in wages.
Wiji Arulampalam, Michael Devereux, and 
Giorgia Maffini20 also use a panel of data, 
examining 55,000 individual companies operating 
in nine European countries (Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom) to examine the 
effect of corporate taxes on employee wages over 
the years 1996-2003. Using microdata on 
individual companies, the study controls for 
many factors that may not be accounted for in 
17
Feld and Kirchgässner, “The Impact of Corporate and 
Personal Income Taxes on the Location of Firms and on 
Employment: Some Panel Evidence for the Swiss Cantons,” 87 J. of 
Pub. Econ. 129 (2002).
18
Djankov et al., “The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment 
and Entrepreneurship,” 2 Am. Econ. J.: Macroeconomics 31 (2010).
19
Hassett and Mathur, “A Spatial Model of Corporate Tax 
Incidence,” 47 Applied Econ. 1350 (2015).
20
Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini, “The Direct Incidence 
of Corporate Income Tax on Wages,” 56 European Econ. Rev. 1038 
(2012).
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previous studies. Arulampalam, Devereux, and 
Maffini are also able to examine the effect of tax 
changes at the individual company level, which is 
advantageous because it accurately depicts 
exactly the amount of tax being paid, although it 
is harder to interpret from a policy perspective. 
Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini find that a 
one-dollar increase in taxes results in companies’ 
total wage bill falling by 49 cents. This effect could 
come via reduced wages, lower employment, or 
some combination of the two.
Besides the previously mentioned theoretical 
explanation in Desai, Foley, and Hines, their work 
offers an empirical investigation into the 
incidence of the corporate tax using data from 
American multinational companies operating 
between 1989 and 2004. They estimate that a large 
portion of corporate taxes are borne by workers. 
While their estimates depend on the period and 
empirical specification, they show that ultimately 
workers pay between 45 percent and 75 percent of 
the corporate tax burden, which suggests that 
wages and employment necessarily fall when 
corporate tax rates rise and vice versa.
Marco Da Rin, Marina Di Giacomo, and 
Alessandro Sembenelli21 show that corporate tax 
policy may interact with other aspects of a 
country’s economy and find that countries with 
better “institutional infrastructure” — that is, a 
respect for the rule of law, predictable changes in 
policy, and strong property rights protected by 
courts with deep knowledge of such issues — 
experience more benefits from lowering their 
corporate taxes. This has implications for U.S. 
corporate tax policy because U.S. institutional 
infrastructure outside the tax code is typically 
regarded favorably in the world economy.
Another important response to the corporate 
tax that has implications for employment and 
wages is how multinational companies choose 
where to locate their operations. Johannes Voget22 
examines the location decisions of multinational 
companies from 1997 to 2007 to determine how 
important corporate taxes are to cross-border 
relocation. Voget finds that companies are quite 
responsive to the burden of home-country 
taxation when considering international 
relocation, and Voget estimates that for an 
increase in repatriation taxes of 10 percentage 
points in the home country, the share of 
multinational companies relocating abroad 
increases by 2.2 percentage points. Put another 
way, this change would increase the number of 
relocations by a third.
James R. Hines Jr.23 examines the sensitivity of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in U.S. states to 
corporate tax policy. Although this is not a direct 
measurement of an employment effect, the 
International Trade Administration attributes 12 
million U.S. jobs to FDI,24 so the link between FDI 
and jobs is important. Hines shows that a state 
corporate tax rate difference of just 1 percent is 
associated with a difference of between 9 and 11 
percent in the share of manufacturing capital 
owned by differently taxed investors.
V. Conclusion and Lessons for Reform
Although the context and technique of the 
studies examining the effects of the corporate 
income tax we cite in this report are different — 
sometimes markedly so — the balance of the 
literature shows a substantial negative effect of 
corporate taxes on labor, through employment, 
wages, and the business location. Studies with the 
stronger results that control for factors of 
influence outside corporate income taxes 
generally have an elasticity of employment 
regarding the corporate income tax rate of 
between -0.2 and -0.4, with a wage-income 
elasticity near -0.5. That is, for a 10 percent 
decrease in the corporate tax rate, the existing 
empirical literature shows an increase in 
employment of between 2 and 4 percent, along 
with a 5 percent gain in wages.
21
Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli, “Entrepreneurship, 
Firm Entry, and the Taxation of Corporate Income: Evidence From 
Europe,” 95 J. of Pub. Econ. 1048 (2009).
22
Voget, “Relocation of Headquarters and International 
Taxation,” 95 J. of Pub. Econ. 1067 (2011).
23
Hines, “Altered States: Taxes and the Location of Foreign 
Direct Investment in America,” 86 Am. Econ. Rev. 1076–1094 (1996).
24
This estimate includes direct employment at foreign-owned 
companies, indirect and induced employment from foreign-owned 
companies, and indirect and induced employment from 
productivity spillovers resulting from foreign-owned companies. 
The figure comes from the International Trade Administration 
publication: Julian Richards and Elizabeth Schaefer, “Jobs 
Attributable to Foreign Direct Investment in the United States,” 
Industry and Analysis Economics Brief, International Trade 
Administration (2016).
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In terms of applicability to potential federal 
changes to the corporate income tax, there are 
some caveats to consider.
First, all empirical estimates are necessarily 
derived from a different time and place than 
when and where a new policy will be 
implemented. This calls into question how similar 
the current economic climate today is to the 
climate (place, time, existing policies, and 
industrial mix) when the studies we cite were 
completed. In terms of studies that examine 
corporate taxes internationally over time, this 
validity problem may be especially severe — the 
United States has a particular set of laws, 
regulations, and workforce characteristics that are 
very different from other countries, all of which 
might make the effect of corporate income taxes 
on employment and wages more or less severe 
here than elsewhere.
Second, the United States has a different 
baseline than other countries that change their 
corporate tax policy — having the highest top 
statutory corporate tax rate among developed 
nations and being the largest economy in the 
world may make the effects of corporate income 
taxes different here.
Third, it is unclear how other countries, U.S. 
state governments, and our own Federal Reserve 
may react to federal corporate tax policy changes; 
any policy changes they enact in response may 
serve to mute or exacerbate expected effects.
Finally, the state-level estimates we cite are all 
in the context of existing federal policy, and while 
there are considerable differences in state 
business climates, these differences pale in 
comparison with many international business 
climate differences. It is likely that the corporate 
income tax interacts with the general business 
climate, which might mean that changing the 
federal corporate income tax would do more to 
attract new companies from outside the United 
States (or slow the flow of corporate inversions) 
than any state change could, resulting in a larger 
effect on employment than state-level estimates 
suggest.
Although there is some uncertainty about 
how well existing empirical estimates would 
translate to any reduction in federal corporate 
income tax, nearly all empirical studies suggest 
there would be some gains for labor from the 
change. This is highlighted by estimates of 
corporate tax incidence that suggest it is labor that 
pays for most of the corporate income tax.? ?
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